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Abstract:  This study uses an experimental design to simulate the ballot counting process during 
a hand-recount after a disputed election.  Applying psychological theories of motivated 
reasoning to the political process, we find that ballot counters’ party identification conditionally 
influences their ballot counting decisions.  Party identification’s effect on motivated reasoning is 
greater when ballot counters are given ambiguous, versus specific, instructions for determining 
voter intent.  This study’s findings have major implications for ballot counting procedures 
throughout the United States and for the use of motivated reasoning in the political science 
literature.  
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Introduction 
It is a foundational principle of American democracy that citizens’ votes should be 
counted in accordance with their intended choice.  Ballots are counted accurately in most cases.  
However, due to improperly marked ballots or a number of other discrepancies, conventional 
vote counting procedures occasionally fail to discern voter intent.  When such occasions arise, 
election administrators are given responsibility for assessing a ballot’s validity and the voter’s 
intent.  Reliance upon election administrators to determine the proper counting of ballots can 
introduce subjectivity into the vote counting process.   
Despite election administrators’ capacity to influence the outcome of closely contested 
elections, no previous study has examined the process by which individuals evaluate questions of 
voter intent.  This study is the first to examine how a specific social-psychological process, 
motivated reasoning, affects the decisions of individuals responsible for determining voter intent 
for challenged ballots in a disputed election.  Fundamentally, it seeks to answer the question: Do 
election officials’ political predispositions guide how they evaluate voter intent when counting 
challenged ballots?  This question is important because almost all elections involve some margin 
of error, with any number of mistakes possibly resulting in the miscounting or misreporting of 
votes.  While many elections are decided by a vote margin larger than the margin of error, others 
are only decided by a small number of votes.  In these elections, just a few errors could decide 
the outcome.  
Elections decided by a small number of votes are likely to be subject to an official dispute 
in which election administrators, and sometimes courts, must resolve complaints raised by a 
losing candidate. Disputed elections have been a mainstay on the American political landscape 
since the time of the country’s founding (e.g., Foley 2008).  Between 1789 and 2002 there have 
been 733 contested elections in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate (Jenkins 
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2004; 2005).
1
  Additionally, there were at least 35 gubernatorial elections between 1904 and 
1994 that resulted in an official contest or recount (Foley 2009).  In recent years, high-profile 
disputed elections and close elections have garnered public attention.  The most famous of these, 
undoubtedly, is the 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore.  Officially, 
Bush carried Florida by only 537 votes.  Although Florida received the most attention because it 
provided Bush with enough electoral votes to secure a majority in the Electoral College, the vote 
total between Bush and Gore also was extraordinarily close in New Mexico, where Gore carried 
the state by a mere 366 votes.  Particularly germane to this study, the 2008 Minnesota Senate 
election between Al Franken and Norm Coleman provides another high-profile, recent example 
of a disputed election.  Over the course of a lengthy recount process, Coleman and Franken 
challenged 3,377 and 3,278 ballots, respectively (Minnesota Secretary of State, 2008a).  
Ultimately, Franken won the election by 312 votes.   
These two disputed elections only scratch the surface of a rich history replete with 
instances in which election administrators’ personal biases could have influenced the election 
outcome.
2
  As such, it is critical that scholars examine the potential for election administrators’ 
                                                 
1
 The data reported by Jenkins (2004, 117) suggest that there were as many as 471 disputed 
election cases in the U.S. House where election officials could have influenced the election’s 
outcome.  Similarly, there were 60 disputed elections in the U.S. Senate during this period in 
which election administrators could have affected the outcome (Jenkins 2005, 59). 
2
 Unfortunately, there does not appear to be systematic data available on state legislative and 
local disputed elections.  However, given the frequency of contested congressional, 
gubernatorial, and other statewide elections, and the substantially larger number of state 
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personal biases to influence election outcomes, and to explore ways in which those biases’ 
influence might be mitigated.  
Election administrators are human beings subject, presumably, to the same biases 
affecting other individuals.  If biases influence how an administrator evaluates voter intent, 
serious problems for the electoral process may result.  Basic principles of fairness require that 
election administrators strive for accuracy and consistency when counting votes.  But, in a 
disputed election featuring numerous ambiguous ballots, it might not be voter intent that 
determines the victor.  Instead, election administrators’ preferences might decide the outcome.  
Research in social psychology (Kunda 1990) has demonstrated that individuals’ predispositions 
often influence their evaluations of ambiguous information.  This study expands upon previous 
research into motivated reasoning to examine its effects in an electoral context.  
This study uses an experimental design to test whether motivated reasoning influences 
the behavior of individuals charged with accepting or rejecting ballot challenges in a disputed 
election.  Experimental participants were presented with a series of challenged ballots in which 
voter intent was ambiguous, and asked to judge whether each ballot challenge should be 
accepted or rejected.  To maximize external validity, the ballots presented to participants 
emulated actual challenged ballots from the 2008 U.S. Senate election in Minnesota.   
This study’s findings indicate that, while participants do not always accept ballot 
challenges from their political party’s candidate, they are more likely to favor their party’s 
candidate when they have a stake in the election outcome and when they are presented with 
ambiguous rules for determining voter intent.  In light of these findings, policymakers should 
                                                                                                                                                             
legislative and local elected offices, disputed elections across all levels of government are not 
uncommon occurrences.     
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consider adopting measures to reduce the influence of partisan preferences in the ballot-counting 
process, by minimizing the stake election administrators might have in the election’s outcome 
and providing election administrators with clear, unambiguous rules for determining voter intent. 
Motivated Reasoning 
Motivated reasoning, or the psychological phenomenon by which individuals’ biases and 
predispositions influence their subsequent attitude formation, has natural implications for 
political science (Fischle 2000; Redlawsk 2002.  Inherent in the idea of motivated reasoning is 
that “wants and desires” may affect individuals’ decision-making processes (Bruner and 
Goodman 1947; Bruner and Mintern 1955).  As Kunda (1990) summarizes, motivated reasoning 
is an amalgamation of both cognitive processes (reasoning towards a conclusion) and 
motivations (preferring one conclusion over another).  
Motivations come in a variety of forms and can be both accuracy- and directionally-
focused (Braman and Nelson, 2007; Chen, Schechter, and Chaiken, 1996; Kunda 1990).  An 
actor motivated by accuracy desires to be precise and correct in her assessments, while that same 
actor motivated by direction may hope for a certain outcome and will justify her attitudes and 
reasoning to reach that outcome.  Directional motives may result in biased processing, an 
actuality found by many political studies (e.g Taber and Lodge 2006).   Scholars have further 
broken down these goals into three groups: accuracy-focused, defense-focused, and impression-
focused (Agrawal and Maheswaran 2005).  The latter two bear similarity to the “directional” 
motives of Kunda.  Generally speaking, both defense- and impression-focused motives result in 
directional outcomes, where a desire other than accuracy affects processing.   
Psychological experiments testing motivated reasoning have demonstrated that 
directional motivates tend to dominate at the expense of accuracy motivates in clear and 
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predictable patterns.  Balcetis and Dunning (2006) show that in order for directional motives to 
be activated over and above accuracy motives, individuals need to feel as though the outcome is 
important and relevant to their own lives.  When individuals do not feel as though they have any 
“stake” in the outcome, there is no reason to suspect that directional motives will be activated.  
When resolving disputed elections, one would hope that accuracy motives are the driving 
force behind ballot counters’ decisions.  However, there are good reasons to question whether 
accuracy motives truly “win out” over directional motives in ballot-counting situations.  Ballot 
counters, like any other group of individuals, have their own desires and motives.  Certainly, 
their training and the seriousness of their task may help to encourage accuracy motives, but as 
Redlawsk (2002) argues, in circumstances where an individual’s desire to reach a favorable 
result is strong, accuracy motives alone are not always sufficient to overcome directional 
motives.  In some cases, scholars have found a “confirmation bias,” whereby individuals will 
change their information search in order to find information more supportive of their original 
beliefs (Redlawsk 2002).  In the case of election administrators, one might anticipate that those 
individuals who are motivated to throw a ballot away might “confirm” characteristics of the 
ballot that would make the ballot be discounted – and this may be the case even when ballot 
counters are well-trained and highly driven by accuracy motives.  Indeed, Wells et al. (2009) 
found that certain political beliefs are influenced by political values, particularly in cases where 
individuals are politically sophisticated.   “Disconfirmation bias,” in a similar vein, occurs when 
people cannot discount their original beliefs when evaluating policies.  This has been found to 
occur across policy areas, and even when individuals are knowledgeable about the policies to 
begin with (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009).    
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Examinations of election administrators suggest that such officials, who ostensibly 
should be motivated exclusively by accuracy, have engaged in behavior directed at reaching their 
preferred result.  Stuart (2004) examined felon voting lists in Florida between 1998 and 2000 and 
found that Republican election officials were more aggressive in using these lists to purge 
individuals from voter registration lists, compared to Democratic election administrators, 
presumably in fear that registered felons would be more likely to support Democratic candidates.  
Dyck and Seabrook (2009) recently examined the vote-by-mail system in Oregon, finding that 
Republican election administrators were more likely than their Democratic counterparts to 
classify Democratic voters as “inactive,” preventing the voter from automatically receiving a 
ballot by mail.  If party affiliation influences an election administrator’s behavior before an 
election when the likely benefit of such behavior is difficult to gauge, there is good reason to 
suspect that partisan attachments would influence ballot counter behavior in a disputed election 
when the likely benefit of such behavior is clearly substantial.     
Directional motives may take on any number of forms.  Ballot-counters may want a 
particular candidate to win an election; they may want a long day to end so that they can be with 
their families; or they may want the entire electoral dispute simply to reach a conclusion.  Any of 
these motivations may influence the attention and care they give each individual ballot.  One 
might reasonably expect governments to anticipate these types of directional motives and to take 
measures to encourage accuracy motives over directional motives.  Ballot-counting statutes are 
one potential solution designed to allow less “wiggle room” for directional motives to bias 
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processing.  However, given the diversity in ballot-counting statutes across jurisdictions, these 
mechanisms might not hold in all circumstances.
3
   
In the case of challenged ballots, individuals may be inclined to count ballots as favoring 
the candidate who shares their party identification (or, in simpler terms, as favoring the candidate 
who they wish to win the election).  Party identification is one of the most important pieces of 
information about a candidate, one of the most stable individual traits, and one of the best 
understood political labels (Converse 1964; Green and Palmquist 1994).  Party identification also 
is included on nearly every state- and federal-level ballot; in most cases, it is the only piece of 
candidate information provided on the ballot, other than the candidate’s name.  Importantly, 
party identification is also the most significant predictor of vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960, 
Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).  Taber and Lodge (2006) find that partisan goals, a broad term designed 
to encompass any goals based on a particularly desired outcome, anchor subsequent political 
processing – even when a person is processing new political information, he is influenced by his 
                                                 
3
 For example, the state of Oregon allows a great degree of freedom in determining voter intent – 
“Any vote from which it is impossible to determine the elector’s choice for the office or measure 
may not be counted” (ORS 254 § 505).  In New Hampshire, a majority vote by poll workers is 
enough to determine voter intent – “If a ballot is marked for any office in a way which does not 
readily admit of counting…then the ballot shall be counted for that office in accordance with the 
majority vote of the election officials present and counting votes…”  (RSA 63 § 659:64).  In 
Michigan, even if voter intent can be discerned, a ballot could be rejected if a voter fails to make 
the proper X or check mark on the ballot – “Marks other than crosses or check marks used to 
designate the intention of the voter shall not be counted” (MCL 116 § 803.1(c)).  Thus, there are 
many different standards for determining voter intent and counting ambiguous ballots.   
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partisan attachment.  They considered party identification as the source of these goals.  As earlier 
examinations of election administrators indicate, if any variable is likely to influence the 
decisions of ballot counters, party identification is it.   
Hypotheses 
Given the substantial evidence suggesting that party identification might act as a 
directional motive for ballot counters, and that these officials are likely to favor the candidate 
sharing their party identification, this study’s first hypothesis states:  
H1: As the strength of a participant’s partisan attachment increases, the participant will 
become more likely to support challenges made by a co-partisan. 
As much of the evidence for motivated reasoning suggests that having a “stake in the 
outcome” increases the influence of these directional motivations, the second hypothesis states:  
H2: As the strength of a participant’s partisan attachment increases and she perceives a 
personal stake in the election outcome, the participant will become more likely to support 
challenges made by a co-partisan. 
Hypothesis 2 is particularly difficult to test, as it is nearly impossible to observe the ballot-
counting process in real-time.  However, even mild psychological benefits associated with aiding 
a favored candidate may be enough to assume that we have created a situation where participants 
will believe that they have a credible stake in the outcome.  Many recent studies demonstrate that 
partisans often feel a strong sense of social identity in connection with their partisan groups 
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 2004). Thus, while seeing a co-partisan win an 
election rarely will lead to direct material benefits for a ballot counter, it is quite plausible that a 
co-partisan’s victory will contribute positively to that individual’s self-concept, simply because a 
member of the same partisan identity group has achieved success while a member, or members, 
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of an opposing partisan identity group has (have) been defeated. A thorough explanation of how 
participants were given a “stake” in the outcome is provided below.  
As indicated above, a variety of ballot-counting “rules” exist, and these rules vary 
considerably across states.  Since highly specific rules leave little room for interpretation, and, by 
extension, little room for motivated reasoning, the third hypothesis states:  
H3: As the strength of a participant’s partisan attachment increases and the ballot 
counting rules are vague and ambiguous, the participant will become more likely to 
support challenges made by a co-partisan.  
Experimental Design 
In order to test this study’s hypotheses, 340 undergraduate students from The Ohio State 
University in Columbus, Ohio, were recruited to participate in a computer-administered 
experiment.  In exchange for their participation, students were given extra credit in their political 
science course.  Twenty percent of participants were racial or ethnic minorities (eight percent 
African-American, five percent Latino, and seven percent Asian-American), forty-five percent 
were female, and ages ranged from eighteen to forty-five, with a median age of twenty years old.   
Using a nonrandom undergraduate sample might be considered problematic for this study 
(Sears 1986).  However, motivated reasoning is a general psychological phenomenon that should 
be operative in younger and older individuals, alike. In fact, previous studies have demonstrated 
that younger people are significantly less likely to engage in motivated reasoning than older 
people (Klaczynski and Robinson 2000). In addition, younger people tend to be less partisan than 
the rest of the adult population (Erikson and Tedin 2007, 153-54).  If partisanship cues 
directional goals among the population subset least likely to hold strong partisan attachments, its 
effects should be even stronger in the general population.  More importantly, many poll workers 
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and election administrators are ordinary citizens.
4
  Poll workers oversee the initial counting of 
ballots at the precinct-level and typically make an initial determination of voter intent.  In 
Minnesota, for example, the secretary of state’s office actively solicits members of the public to 
serve as “election judges” at the polls.  The only requirements to hold this position are that the 
applicant must: (1) be eligible to vote in Minnesota; (2) be able to read, write, and speak English; 
(3) not be the spouse or relative of an election judge serving in the same precinct; (4) not be a 
candidate or relative of any candidate appearing on the ballot in that precinct.  Because it is so 
                                                 
4
 Aside from polls workers, county/state boards of election are important players in disputed 
elections.  If a candidate challenges the initial ballot-counting decision of poll workers, it is 
possible for a county/state board of election (or a court) to review these decisions.  These 
individuals may or may not be political elites.  For example, in Ohio, the county board of 
election is comprised of four individuals, selected and equally balanced among the major 
political parties (R.C. 3501.06-3501.07).  In Pennsylvania, the county board of election is 
comprised of the county commissioners, who are elected officials who represent the two major 
political parties (25 P.S. §§2641-2642).  Additionally, membership of the state board of 
canvassers must be evenly divided between the major political parties in Michigan (MCL § 
168.22), and nominees to the state canvassing board are submitted by the central committees of 
the major political parties (Ibid.).  A similar law applies to the state board of elections in North 
Carolina (N.C.G.S. § 163-19), and the county boards of election in New York (New York 
Election Law § 3-204).  Thus, in several states, members of boards of elections are either 
selected by or obtained their positions with significant support from the major political parties.  
As such, these individuals should be likely to support the interests of their political party when 
reviewing disputed ballots.    
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difficult to obtain applicants to fill these poll worker positions, states have recruited high school 
students as young as sixteen years old to serve in a trainee program (see Minnesota Secretary of 
State, 2008b).  The U.S. Election Assistance Commission recently authorized $750,000 in grant 
money for the purpose of recruiting college students to serve as poll workers and assistants (U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission, 2009)
5
.  
Certainly we expect actual ballot counters to have accuracy motivates as well as the 
possible directional motivates we examine below.  We took several steps to make accuracy 
motives salient to participants.  First, we, as experimental proctors, provided a verbal 
introduction of the experiment to participants upon their entering the experimental lab in which 
we explained that the objective of their participation was to determine, to the best of their ability, 
the actual intent of voters on a number of contested ballots.  Second, participants were provided 
with a sheet of paper instructing them on how to accurately determine voter intent.  These ballot 
counting guidelines repeatedly emphasized accurately determining voter intent, and at no point 
did they describe any other motivation as valid.  Third, before beginning the experiment, 
participants were presented with a series of on-screen instructions explaining that they were to 
act as “an election official charged with the responsibility of deciding” the validity and voter 
                                                 
5
  The data reported in the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey sponsored by the 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission shows that 10.5% of all poll workers surveyed nationally 
were under the age of 25 (U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2008).  These data a similar to 
another 2008 national survey of poll workers conducted by the Election Administration Research 
Center at the University of California, Berkeley and the Verified Voting Foundation.  In this 
survey, 11.1% of poll workers surveyed were under the age of 29 (Election Administration 
Research Center 2008).   
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intent of each challenged ballot.  Participants were instructed to “thoughtfully” consider each 
response, “take [their] time to examine the vote,” and to refer at any time to the hard copy 
instructions for determining voter intent.  Each of these steps was specifically designed to 
repeatedly make salient to participants their overriding responsibility as ballot counters to 
accurately determine voter intent.  
Experimental participants were presented with a series of sixteen contested ballots 
purportedly cast in a recent election for the U.S. House of Representatives in which voter intent 
was ambiguous.  To maximize external validity, each challenged ballot presented to participants 
was modeled carefully after actual challenged ballots cast in the 2008 U.S. Senate election in 
Minnesota, between incumbent Republican Norm Coleman and Democratic challenger Al 
Franken.
6
  For each challenged ballot, participants were told which candidate challenged the 
initial ballot ruling and the basis for the candidate’s challenge.  Participants then were asked to 
accept or reject the challenge.
7
   
 The experiment contained three manipulations to which participants were assigned 
randomly.  First, the candidates presented to participants varied in terms of their party 
identification.  A control group of participants was presented with ballots not containing party 
                                                 
6
 Ballots were obtained from the Minnesota Public Radio website, August 20, 2009. 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/round1/index.shtml.   
7
 Challenges came from either of the two major party candidates on the ballot.  Two other minor 
party candidates also appeared on the ballot.  Participants cast only four of 6,816 total votes in 
favor of the two minor party candidates (we assume this to be a function of respondent error).  
Participants’ choices were therefore restricted to awarding challenged ballots to one of the two 
candidates involved in the challenges or discarding the ballot altogether. 
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labels.  Without party labels, no partisan basis was available for participants to engage in 
motivated reasoning when deciding whether to accept or reject challenges.   
A second group of participants was presented with ballots featuring fictitious candidates, 
including one Republican and one Democrat.  Hypothesis 1 suggests that participants should be 
more likely to accept challenges made by the candidate representing the party with which the 
participant identified and more likely to reject challenges made by the candidate representing the 
party with which the participant did not identify.   
A third group of participants was presented with ballots featuring real candidates.  In 
accordance with Hypothesis 2, this manipulation was included in order to determine whether 
motivated reasoning was more likely to occur when participants had a personal stake in the 
election outcome.  We selected candidates from the very competitive 2008 U.S. House election 
in Ohio’s 15th District (which includes The Ohio State University).  The candidates in that race 
included Republican Steve Stivers, Democrat Mary Jo Kilroy, and two minor party candidates.  
Using candidates from the Kilroy/Stivers election best allowed the personal stake felt by 
participants to approximate the feelings of personal stake of actual ballot counters.  The 15
th
 
District of Ohio is the home district of many of the participants.
8
  Both the Kilroy and Stivers 
campaigns actively recruited on The Ohio State University campus and advertised heavily in the 
Columbus media market.
9
  The experiment was completed within three months of Kilroy being 
                                                 
8
 In Ohio, college students are permitted to list a school address when registering to vote 
(http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/voterInformation/regToVote.aspx).  August 20, 2009.   
9
 Kilroy and Stivers engaged in an expensive campaign, spending a combined $5 million, making 
it the most expensive 2008 House race in Ohio. August 20, 2009. 
http://www.fec.gov/DisclosureSearch/HSProcessCandList.do?ull.  
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declared the winner by the narrow margin of 2,312 votes, and only after considerable delay and 
talk of the possibility of an actual recount.  As a result (and most importantly for the purposes of 
our experiment), in comparison with participants presented with ballots featuring fictitious 
candidates, participants presented with ballots featuring real candidates were more likely to feel 
they had a personal stake in the election outcome.
10
  However, because we are unable to 
perfectly approximate the unique environment of contested elections, participants may be less 
likely to feel the same level of stake as actual ballot counters.  Although a possible limitation, the 
distinction between experimental participants and actual ballot counters should work against 
finding support for Hypothesis 2.  If Hypothesis 2 finds support, the results should be interpreted 
as a conservative estimate of the effect of personal stake on ballot counting.       
 A second manipulation concerned which candidates challenged each ballot’s initial 
ruling.  Since some ballot challenges were more credible than others, failure to vary the 
candidate challenging a particular ballot was likely to bias responses in favor of the candidate 
posing the more credible challenges.  To address this concern, each participant was assigned 
randomly to one of two versions of each ballot, one in which the Republican candidate 
challenged the initial ruling on how to count the ballot and one in which the Democratic 
candidate challenged the initial ruling. 
                                                 
10
 Participants were presented with a female candidate only in the real candidate condition.  
While presenting these participants with a female candidate might seem problematic because 
participants in the other candidate conditions were presented only with male candidates, Kilroy’s 
inclusion was necessary to test Hypotheses 2.  We control for the gender of participants in our 
statistical models.  Models estimated without a gender control are not substantively different.    
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 The third manipulation addresses Hypothesis 3 by randomly assigning the type of ballot 
counting rules presented to each participant.  As noted earlier, the rules for counting ballots vary 
considerably by state; some rules are rather ambiguous and some are quite specific, leaving 
different amounts of room for interpretation.  To capture this variation and to maximize both 
external validity and the participants’ accuracy motives, we obtained two sets of rules provided 
to ballot counters in different states
11
 and condensed each to be of reasonable length for the 
experimental setting.  To represent clear, specific ballot counting rules, we used portions of the 
Minnesota Recount Guide, published by the Minnesota Secretary of State’s office.12  According 
to this office, the ballot counting rules provide aid “for election officials and their staff who may 
participate in an election recount” (3).  Minnesota’s ballot counting rules contain both text-based 
instructions and graphical representations of acceptable and unacceptable ballots.  Presumably, 
these rules are relatively easy to comprehend.  In addition, the graphical examples serve as 
particularly helpful guides to the participants.  
Participants not receiving the Minnesota rules were instead provided with a condensed 
version of North Carolina’s “Standards for Determining What Constitutes a Vote and What Will 
Be Counted as a Vote” and the accompanying relevant portions of North Carolina General 
                                                 
11
 These ballot guides are not assumed to be representative of all possible state ballot guidelines.  
They are simply examples of two different ways states choose to inform ballot counters and are 
intended to represent two points on a hypothetical “ambiguity” continuum of recount guides. 
12
 The Minnesota 2008 Recount Guide, August 20, 2009: http://www.sos.state.mn.us/ 
docs/recount_guide_2008.pdf.  Specifically, we provided respondents with portions of section 
13, entitled “Determining Voter Intent” (8-10).  See the Web Appendix for more details. 
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Statutes, made publicly available by the North Carolina State Board of Elections Office.
13
  
According to the State Board of Elections, “…these standards and procedures…define what is a 
vote and when that vote should be counted in circumstances in which voting systems are unable 
to determine the voter’s intent with respect to a marked ballot” (2).  North Carolina’s ballot 
counting rules contain only a dense set of text instructions, mostly reiterating that “the ballot 
shall be counted according to the voter’s indicated intent unless it is impossible to determine the 
voter’s intent” (5).  Presumably, these rules allow substantial leeway and discretion for the ballot 
counter, particularly in contrast to Minnesota’s specific ballot counting rules.   
In accordance with Hypothesis 3, we expect that motivated reasoning is more likely to 
occur when the rules for counting ballots are relatively ambiguous and open to interpretation.  
Thus, we assigned participants randomly to receive one of two ballot counting rules, either a 
modified version of Minnesota’s relatively specific rules or a modified version of North 
Carolina’s relatively ambiguous rules.14   
 After viewing all twenty ballots and choosing whether to accept or reject each ballot 
challenge, participants answered a series of questions relevant to their attitudes toward counting 
challenged ballots.  First were questions relating to participants’ political characteristics, 
including party identification, political knowledge, political interest, and political efficacy.  
Second were questions addressing cognitive processes, including participants’ need for closure 
and need for cognition.  Finally, participants were presented with a set of demographic measures, 
including age, gender, race/ethnicity, and education. 
                                                 
13
 The North Carolina standards, August 20, 2009: 
http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/getdocument.aspx?id=219.  See the Web Appendix for more details. 
14
 Copies of the ballot counting rules and the ballots themselves are in the online web-appendix. 
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Methodology and Measurement  
 From participants’ rulings on the challenged ballots and responses to questionnaire items, 
we constructed a series of models appropriate for testing Hypotheses 1-3.  The dependent 
variable is coded as one if the participant accepted a candidate’s challenge on a particular ballot 
and zero if the challenge was rejected.  Two key independent variables also are included in our 
models.  The first is a dummy variable representing the party identification of the candidate 
challenging a ballot, coded one if the candidate was a Republican and zero if the candidate was a 
Democrat (no minor party ballot challenges were presented to participants).  The second key 
independent variable was a self-reported party identification measure, ranging from zero (strong 
Democrat) to six (strong Republican), with a mean of 2.7.  These two variables were used to 
create an interaction variable capable of directly testing Hypothesis 1.  In accordance with 
Hypothesis 1, we expect the interaction term’s coefficient to be positively signed, thereby 
indicating that participants become increasingly likely to accept a Republican candidate’s ballot 
challenge as they self-identify more strongly with the Republican Party. 
 To test the effect of partisan motivations, our model also controls for several independent 
variables relevant to ballot counting.  First, we control for political knowledge.  Participants 
scoring relatively high on political knowledge are most likely to be familiar with disputed 
elections’ norms and processes.  Political knowledge was measured using nine factual 
knowledge questions about the United States government and its leaders.
15
  Each knowledge 
                                                 
15
 These nine questions included the five standard political knowledge questions advocated by 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997), as well as four additional and similar questions.  We included 
the four extra questions in order to create more variation among participants. 
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question is scored one for a correct answer and zero for an incorrect answer, thus creating a 
political knowledge scale ranging from zero to nine (mean 5.6).   
In addition to political knowledge, we also control for participants’ level of trust in 
government.  Participants who believe the government tends to be corrupt or inefficient (or both) 
could be particularly likely to doubt the integrity of the ballot counting process and accept 
challenges to initial ballot rulings.  Trust in government was measured as a summary score 
ranging from zero to fifty-six (mean 37.07), derived from participants’ level of agreement on a 
seven-point Likert scale using eight standard American National Election Studies (ANES) with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of trust in government.   
Also, our model controls for two relevant cognitive processing variables, need for closure 
and need for cognition.  Need for closure is a psychological concept referring to individuals’ 
willingness to quickly arrive at a firm conclusion or patiently consider the merits of multiple 
competing perspectives (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Webster and Kruglanski 1994).  
Individuals’ need for closure scores could be inversely related to the likelihood of accepting a 
ballot challenge because recognizing the ambiguity of voter intent is likely to make participants 
high in need for closure uncertain and uncomfortable.  Need for cognition refers to individuals’ 
willingness to engage in cognitively complex tasks (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).  Need for 
cognition is included because it could influence the acceptance of ballot challenges, particularly 
if the least cognitively demanding approach is to ignore the merits of the challenger’s claim and 
reject the challenge. 
 Need for closure and need for cognition measures each were presented as a series of 
seven-point Likert scales, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  Need for 
closure was measured as an index of five questions ranging in values from zero to thirty-five 
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(mean 21.56), with high scores representing high need for closure.  Need for cognition was 
measured similarly as an index of six questions ranging in values from zero to forty-two (mean 
26.57), with high scores representing high need for cognition.  
Finally, our model controls for gender’s effect on ballot counting.  Previous research 
indicates that men tend to be more assertive and women more agreeable, suggesting that female 
participants might be more likely than male participants to accept ballot challenges (see Schmitt, 
et al. 2008). 
Results 
Looking first at the effect of the ballot type on accepting ballot challenges, a one-way 
ANOVA reports that the levels of acceptance are not significantly different across the real and 
fictitious candidates (F = 1.67, df = 1, p < 0.197).  This result is consistent with expectations; we 
have no a priori reason to expect challenges from real candidates would be more convincing than 
identical challenges from fake ones, or vice versa.  A one-way ANOVA of the acceptance rates 
across the rules condition, however, reveals significant differences (F=187.32, df=1, p<0.001).  
Regardless of the ballot type, individuals who were given the specific rules with illustrated 
examples of valid and invalid votes accepted a significantly higher proportion of challenges than 
those who were given the ambiguous rules (51.4 percent to 30.7 percent).  
In order to assess how strength of partisanship affects the likelihood of accepting a ballot 
challenge, we turn to logistic regression.  Table 1 presents a direct test of Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Standing alone, Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  The interaction between an individual’s party 
identification and the dummy indicating a Republican challenge is not statistically significant, 
indicating that participants’ party identification fails to predict whether a ballot challenge was 
accepted across both types of ballots.   
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(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Normatively, this finding is appealing; there does not appear to be any relationship 
between party identification and the decision of a participant to accept or reject a challenged 
ballot.  However, while the motivated reasoning literature suggests participants should be more 
likely to accept a ballot challenge from a co-partisan, this may be true only when the participant 
feels that she has a stake in the outcome.  To provide a full test of motivated reasoning in ballot 
counting, it is necessary that participants feel that they have a stake in the outcome, which is 
represented by the use of real candidates on the ballot, as opposed to fictitious ones.   
The additional interaction adds this important distinction and the results confirm the 
importance of participants feeling they have a stake in the outcome to activate directional 
motives at the expense of accuracy motives.  Here, the interaction is positive and statistically 
significant.  The model predicts an otherwise typical strong Republican reviewing a Republican 
ballot challenge with fake candidates to accept that challenge with a 0.37 probability.  However, 
that predicted probability of acceptance increases to 0.46 if the real candidate names appear on 
the ballot.  There is a similar substantive effect for Democrats.  The predicted probability of an 
otherwise typical strong Democrat accepting a Democratic challenge is 0.38 when fake names 
are on the ballot, but jumps to 0.45 with real names.  This result, while less normatively 
appealing, is consistent with expectations derived from the motivated reasoning literature.  The 
results also suggest that a feeling of personal stake in the outcome was activated in participants 
by using real candidates.  If our experimental design failed to activate any feeling of stake, the 
results should be identical across both ballot types, but this is not the case. 
 Table 1’s results, while consistent with the tenets of motivated reasoning, tell only part of 
the story.  A second consideration in the motivated reasoning literature surrounds the question of 
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ambiguity.  Hypothesis 3 proposes that motivated reasoning’s effects should be strongest when 
the rules for assessing ballot challenges are ambiguous.  To test this hypothesis, participants were 
divided into two rules conditions: half of the participants received specific rules while the other 
half received ambiguous rules (the Minnesota and North Carolina ballot counting rules, 
respectively).  We expect motivated reasoning’s effects to be stronger for participants in the 
ambiguous rules condition.  The results presented in Table 2 support this hypothesis.   
(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 Consistent with the results presented in Table 1, there is no evidence of motivated 
reasoning when participants did not have a stake in the election outcome.  The third and fourth 
columns of Table 2 test motivated reasoning’s effect across rules conditions when participants 
had a stake in the outcome; that is, when real candidates were on the ballot.  These results 
conform entirely to our expectations.   
Turning first to the specific rules condition (Column 3), the interaction of candidate and 
participant party identification is correctly signed but insignificant.  However, strong evidence 
for the hypothesized effect of rule specificity is found among those provided with the ambiguous 
rules condition’s (Column 4).  Here the interaction term is positive and statistically significant.16  
                                                 
16
 Pooling the data into a single model and using several interactions would provide the most 
efficient test of the equality (or lack thereof) of these coefficients. Unfortunately, due to severe 
multicollinearity between the necessary interaction and lower-order terms we cannot follow this 
approach.  However, Allison (1999) shows that properly specified interactive models and 
separate regressions are equivalent (186).  Hoetker (2007) demonstrates that although problems 
of residual variation can occur when comparing logit and probit coefficients, “the researcher can 
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Taken together, Table 2 confirms that motivated reasoning is more likely to occur when 
participants had a “stake” in the election outcome and when presented with ambiguous ballot 
counting rules. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the results from Table 2 are not only statistically significant, 
but also substantively consequential.  Figure 1 graphs the predicted probability of accepting a 
Democratic challenge when participants have a stake in the outcome, or when participants were 
presented with ballots featuring real candidates.  Several points are worth noting.  First, the 
predicted probability of accepting a ballot challenge is lower for participants presented with 
ambiguous, rather than the specific, rules.  Only when participants identified as “Strong 
Democrats” is this effect statistically indistinguishable across rule conditions, although the 
substantive effect remains clear.  This result is not surprising; it suggests that participants’ 
default position was to reject a ballot challenge unless there was a clear rationale for accepting it.  
Presumably, the specific rules provided in Minnesota afforded participants such a rationale.  In 
contrast, the ambiguous North Carolina rules provided less assurance that some ballots indeed 
were spoiled and should not be counted.   
(INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 Second, consistent with our expectations, participant party identification’s effect is 
stronger in the ambiguous rules condition than in the specific rules condition.  When provided 
specific ballot counting rules, the probability of accepting a Democratic challenge decreases 
from 0.52 for a strong Democrat to 0.44 for a strong Republican.  When presented with 
ambiguous ballot counting rules, however, the probability of accepting a Democratic challenge 
                                                                                                                                                             
– at a minimum – compare the statistical significance of the coefficients across groups” (338).  
This is the approach we follow here.    
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decreases from 0.36 for a strong Democrat to 0.20 for a strong Republican.  This shift represents 
nearly a two-fold increase in the magnitude of the change in predicted probability across the 
rules conditions, indicating that the ambiguous rules facilitate the influence of directional 
motivations in the ballot counting process, seemingly at the expense of accuracy. 
Substantive Application of Findings 
 
 The findings discussed in the previous section indicate that party identification, the 
participant’s stake in the election outcome, and the specificity of the ballot counting guidelines 
can affect ballot counters’ judgments during a hand-recount.  However, since it is difficult to 
conceptualize the potential impact of these variables when they are couched in the language of 
logistic regression coefficients, this section applies the experimental findings to a hypothetical 
recount scenario.  For the purposes of this analysis, we apply our findings to the 2008 Minnesota 
U.S. Senate election, which yielded a statewide recount of 6,655 challenged ballots.  The 
Republican candidate, Norm Coleman, challenged 3,377 ballots and the Democratic candidate, 
Al Franken, challenged 3,278 ballots.  Using these figures as a framework for our hypothetical 
election scenario, we can calculate the substantive effects of our experimental findings.   
 Using the logistic regression coefficients from the models featuring ballots from the real 
candidates condition, we calculate the percentage of ballots that would be accepted by ballot 
counters while varying the party identification of the counter and the specificity of the ballot 
counting rules presented to them.
17
  Assuming that the predicted probability of accepting a ballot 
challenge translates into that percentage of ballots being accepted in the aggregate, the top 
                                                 
17
 Ballot counters used in the analysis were coded as female with mean levels of knowledge, 
trust, cognition, and closure. 
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portion of Table 3 presents the expected percentages of accepted ballot challenges by rules 
condition and partisan identification. 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
These percentages are not much more helpful than regression coefficients in explaining 
the magnitude of motivated reasoning’s impact.  In order to make its effects more readily 
interpretable, we can use the acceptance rates to show how ballot counters’ partisan preferences 
could affect the outcome of our hypothetical recount scenario.  Going into the final recount, we 
assume that the Republican candidate led the Democratic candidate by 215 votes.
18
  Using these 
figures, we can calculate the effects on the election outcome produced by ballot counters’ party 
identification and the specificity of the ballot counting rules provided to them.  
The bottom half of Table 3 shows the predicted net vote gain for the Democratic 
candidate, given our assumptions.  Keep in mind that the purpose of this exercise is not to say 
that the specific values shown represent exact and quantifiable gains and losses.  In fact, this 
certainly is not the case, because our experiment did not take into account the possibility that one 
candidate’s challenges might have been more credible than those of other candidates.  Instead, 
our purpose here is to show that the experimental effects uncovered in our analysis indeed can 
have a substantive impact on the outcome of an actual disputed election.   
The bottom half of Table 3 shows the Democratic candidate’s predicted net vote gain, 
using the acceptance rate from the real candidate experimental condition and, therefore, 
maximizing the participants’ stake in the election outcome.  If the ballot counters (or the median 
voter on a panel of ballot counters) are strong Democrats, our model predicts that the Democratic 
                                                 
18
 This figure was taken from the 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate race.  After the recount, Franken 
held a 215 vote lead, although his lead was expanded to 351 votes after further legal action. 
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candidate would gain 387 votes.  Comparatively, if the ballot counters are pure independents, the 
Democratic candidate would gain only twenty-five votes.  Finally, if the ballot counters are 
strong Republicans, our model predicts that the recount would net the Republican candidate 326 
votes.  Our model suggests that the ballot counter’s party identification will produce a difference 
in the number of challenged ballots awarded to the Democratic candidate as high as 713 votes.  
Given that the Republican candidate from our hypothetical election scenario entered the final 
canvass with a 215 vote lead, the effects produced by varying the ballot counter’s party 
identification are substantial. 
Table 3 further demonstrates how using specific ballot counting guidelines can reduce 
partisanship’s effects on the results of the recount.  It is clear that individuals’ partisan 
motivations affect their decisions to accept or reject a ballot challenge, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, when presented with ambiguous ballot counting guidelines.  The vote difference 
between strong Democrats and strong Republicans for those given the ambiguous directions is 
1,021.  However, the provision of specific ballot counting guidelines reduces this difference by 
more than half, to just 493 votes.  This 598-vote swing in the specific rules condition would fail 
to put the Democratic candidate in the lead.  However, the Democratic candidate would win by 
228 votes if the ballot counters were provided with ambiguous criteria for evaluating challenged 
ballots.  It is clear that the ambiguous directions give much greater leeway for personal attributes 
to affect the ballot decisions through motivated reasoning than when ballot counters are given 
specific guidelines. 
Conclusion   
 In addition to demonstrating the applicability of motivated reasoning to the study of 
political science, this study reinforces an important finding in the motivated reasoning literature, 
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that an individual’s decisions are motivated by the knowledge that she has a stake in the outcome 
of the reasoning task.  This study broadens the conceptualization of having stakes to include the 
outcome of a real and salient election.  
 This study’s findings also have important methodological implications for political 
psychology experiments.  While there are good reasons for using fictitious candidates in an 
experiment (e.g., minimizing potential participant bias against a candidate), the results presented 
here suggest that there might be situations that warrant using real candidates.  At least in those 
instances where participants have a stake in the outcome of a political event, using real 
candidates in experimental conditions may help to achieve a higher level of external validity and 
to detect statistically significant effects.  Undoubtedly, further research is required to expand 
upon this initial finding.    
 This study’s findings should also be useful to policymakers responsible for state election 
laws.  The results provide support for the claim that if ballot counters do not have a stake in an 
election outcome and are provided with clear ballot counting guidelines, their directional motives 
are minimized (i.e., ballot counters are less likely to see an ambiguous ballot as benefiting the 
candidate who shares their party identification).   
Policymakers interested in activating accuracy motives should attempt to develop clear, 
unambiguous standards to be used when counting disputed ballots.  Rather than providing ballot 
counters with dense language and an ambiguous definition of voter intent, ballot counting rules 
should clearly define what does and does not constitute voter intent.  Additionally, pictorial 
examples of acceptable and unacceptable ballots, much like what was presented in the specific 
(Minnesota) rules, also should counter motivated reasoning’s effects. 
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Minimizing a ballot counter’s stake in an election outcome is particularly difficult, 
especially when political officials, such as a secretary of state, may decide the validity of a 
particular ballot or vote choice.  There appears to be no obvious way to minimize a ballot 
counter’s investment in an election outcome.  As a preliminary suggestion, one potential way to 
minimize a ballot counter’s stake in an election, particularly a non-statewide election, is to invite 
ballot counters from other jurisdictions to review challenged ballots.  Presumably, ballot counters 
who reside outside of a local jurisdiction would have a diminished stake in a given election.  
 Regardless of the corrective measures that might be adopted to minimize motivated 
reasoning, this study provides evidence that cognitive biases among ballot counters can affect a 
close election’s outcome.  Ballot counters are most susceptible to motivated reasoning when they 
have a stake in an election’s outcome and when they are given ambiguous ballot counting 
guidelines to discern voter intent.  Judging by these results, it would appear that election 
administrators who Americans entrust with upholding the foundational ideal of free and fair 
elections may, in fact, often fall short of this ideal.  In this sense, the winner of a disputed 
election is not readily apparent to the individuals responsible for its resolution; rather, the 
election’s outcome lay in the eye of the beholder. 
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Table 1:  Predicting the Likelihood of Accepting a Ballot Challenge 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Republican Challenger 0.451 0.336 
Party ID 0.054 0.072 
Ballot Condition 0.272 0.172 
Party ID x Republican Challenger  -0.152 0.897 
Party ID x Ballot Condition -0.069 0.049 
Republican Challenger x Ballot 
Condition 
-0.423 0.228 
Party ID x Republican Challenger 
x Ballot Condition 
0.153** 0.058 
Political Knowledge 0.088* 0.038 
Trust in Government -0.007 0.013 
Need for Closure -0.004 0.012 
Need for Cognition 0.004 0.014 
Gender 0.013 0.102 
Constant 
 
-1.048 0.716 
Observations 3,568 
Number of Clusters 223 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2,361.81 
 
Estimates are logistic regression coefficients.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered by 
participant. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2:  Predicting the Likelihood of Accepting a Ballot Challenge by Partisan Condition and Rules Condition 
Estimates are logistic regression coefficients.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors clustered by participant. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Fake Partisan,  
Specific Rules 
Fake Partisan,  
Ambiguous Rules 
Real Partisan,  
Specific Rules 
Real Partisan,  
Ambiguous Rules 
Republican Challenger 
 
0.216 
(0.272) 
-0.085 
(0.169) 
-0.231 
(0.247) 
 
-0.734** 
(0.256) 
Party ID 
 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.068 
(0.046) 
-0.141** 
(0.049) 
Party ID x Republican Challenger 0.039 
(0.067) 
-0.048 
(0.045) 
0.101 
(0.059) 
 
0.269*** 
(0.066) 
Political Knowledge 
 
0.073 
(0.064) 
0.03 
(0.055) 
 
0.084 
(0.075) 
0.017 
(0.055) 
Trust in Government  -0.039 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.02) 
 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.02 
(0.021) 
Need for Closure 0.027 
(0.025) 
-0.01 
(0.016) 
 
0.01 
(0.022) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
Need for Cognition 0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
 
0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Gender 0.066 
(0.163) 
-0.004 
(0.165) 
 
-0.145 
(0.178) 
-0.191 
(0.205) 
Constant -0.114 
(1.199) 
-0.888 
(1.052) 
0.184 
(1.385) 
1.200 
(1.113) 
Observations 752 1264 768 784 
Number of Clusters 47 79 48 49 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -515.5 -756.7 -528.7 -462.1 
Chi-Square 12.04 10.74 7.004 23.50 
Prob > Chi-Square 0.149 0.217 0.536 0.00278 
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Table 4:  Hypothetical Recount Effects 
 
Participant Party 
Identification 
Real Candidates 
(Both Conditions) 
Specific Directions Only Ambiguous Directions 
Only 
 Democratic 
Challenges 
 
Republican 
Challenges 
Democratic 
Challenges 
Republican 
Challenges 
Democratic 
Challenges 
Republican 
Challenges 
Acceptance Percentages       
Strong Democrat 42.3 29.6 51.3 45.7 33.7 19.6 
Independent 35.7 33.9 46.2 48.0 25.0 26.4 
Strong Republican 29.6 38.4 42.2 50.5 17.9 34.5 
 
Recount Benefit to 
the Democrat 
      
Strong Democrat 387 138 443 
Pure Independent 25 -107 -72 
Strong Republican -326 -355 -578 
Range of Difference 713 493 1021 
Predicted probabilities are calculated with the logistic regression coefficients from the models that used the ballots with real 
candidates in Tables 2 and 3. 
Entries in bold indicate that the result would result in a Democratic victory, assuming a 215 vote deficit at the beginning of 
the recount and assuming 3377 ballots challenged by the Republican, 3278 by the Democrat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
32 
References 
Agrawal, Nidhi, and Maheswaran, Durairaj. (2005). Motivated reasoning in outcome-bias 
effects.  Journal of Consumer Research 31: 798-805.  
Allison, Paul D. (1999). Comparing logit and probit coefficients across groups. Sociological 
Methods & Research 28: 198-208. 
Balcetis, Emily, & Dunning, David. (2006). See what you want to see: Motivational influences 
on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 612-625. 
Braman, Eileen and Nelson, Thomas E. (2007). Mechanism of motivated reasoning? Analogical 
perception in US discrimination disputes. American Journal of Political Science 51: 940-
956. 
Bruner, Jerome S., and Goodman, Cecile C. (1947). Value and need as organizing factors in 
perception. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 42: 33-44. 
Bruner, Jerome S., and Mintern, Leigh A. (1955).  Perceptual identification and conceptual 
organization. Journal of General Psychology, 53: 21-28.   
Cacioppo, John T., and Petty, Richard E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 42: 116-131. 
Campbell, Angus, Converse, Phillip, Miller, Warren, and Donald Stokes. (1960). The American 
Voter. New York: John Wiley and sons, Inc.  
Chen, Serena H., Shechter, David E., and Chaiken, Shelly. (1996). Getting at the truth or getting 
along: Accuracy- versus impression- motivated heuristic and systematic processing. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71: 262–75. 
Converse, Phillip E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In David A. Apter 
(ed.), Ideology and Discontent, pp. 206-261. New York: The Free Press 
  
 
33 
Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Keeter, Scott. (1997). What Americans know about politics and 
why it matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.   
Dyck, Joshua J. and Nicholas R. Seabrook.  (2009).  The problem with vote-by-mail.  Paper 
presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.  
Chicago, Il.  March 18, 2009.   
Election Administration Research Center and Verified Voting Foundation.  (2008).  Poll 
workers. <http://earc.berkeley.edu/poll.php>.  May 24, 2010.   
Erikson, Robert S., and Tedin, Kent L. (2007). American Public Opinion, 7
th
 edition. New York: 
Pearson Longman. 
Fischle, Mark.  (2000). Mass response to the Lewinsky scandal: Motivated reasoning or 
Bayesian updating? Political Psychology 21(1): 135-159. 
Foley, Edward B. (2008).  The original Bush v. Gore: An historical perspective on disputed 
elections.  University Distinguished Lecture delivered at The Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio. 4 October, 2008. 
—–––. (2009).  Gubernatorial contests.  Lecture delivered at The Past, Present, and Future of 
Disputed Elections, sponsored by The University of Miami Law Review, University of 
Miami, Miami, Florida. 30-31 January 2009. 
Green, Donald P. and Palmquist, Bradley. (1994). How stable is party identification? Political 
Behavior 16: 437-466.  
Green, Donald P., Palmquist, Bradley and Schickler, Eric. (2002). Partisan hearts and minds: 
political parties and the social identities of voters.  New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Greene, Stephen. (2004). Social identity theory and party identification. Social Science Quarterly 
65: 136-53. 
  
 
34 
Hoetker, Glenn. (2007). The use of logit and probit models in strategic manageament research: 
critical issues. Strategic Management Journal 28: 331-343. 
Jenkins, Jeffrey A. (2004).  Partisanship and contested election cases in the House of 
Representatives, 1789-2002.  Studies in American Political Development.  18: 112-135. 
—–––.  (2005).  Partisanship and contested election cases in the Senate, 1789-2002.  Studies in 
American Political Development.  19: 53-74. 
Klaczynski, Paul A., and Billi Robinson. (2000). Personal theories, intellectual ability, and 
epistemological beliefs: adult age differences in everyday reasoning biases. Psychology 
and Aging 15: 400-416. 
Kruglanski, Arie W., and Webster, Donna M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “seizing 
and freezing.” Psychological Review 103: 263-283. 
Kunda, Ziva. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin 108: 480-498.  
Lewis-Beck, Michael, Norpoth, Helmut, Jacoby, William, Converse, Phillip and Herbert 
Weisberg. (2008). The American Voter revisited. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press.  
Minnesota Secretary of State. (2008a). Election reporting.  
<http://electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/20081104/SenateRecount.asp>.  August 20, 2009. 
—–––.  (2008b).  Serve as an election judge.  
<http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=585>.  August 20, 2009. 
Redlawsk, David. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated 
reasoning on political decision making. Journal of Politics 64: 1021-1044.   
  
 
35 
Schmitt, David P., Realo, Anu, Voracek, Martin and Allik, Juri. 2008. Why can’t a man be more 
like a woman?  Sex differences in big five personality traits across 55 cultures. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 94: 168-182. 
Sears, David O. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: influences of a narrow data base 
on social psychology’s view of human nature. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 51: 515-530. 
Stuart, Guy.  (2004).  Databases, felons, and voting: Bias and partisanship of the Florida felon 
list in the 2000 Elections.  Political Science Quarterly 119: 453-475. 
Taber, Charles and Lodge, Milton. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political 
beliefs. American Journal of Political Science 50: 755-769.    
Taber, Charles, Cann, Damon, and Simona Kucsova. (2009).  The motivated processing of 
political arguments.” Political Behavior 31:137-155. 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission.  (2008). 2008 election administration and voting survey.  
<http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2008%20Election%20Administration%20and
%20Voting%20Survey%20EAVS%20Report.pdf >.  July 12, 2010.    
—–––. (2009). EAC will award grants to recruit the next generation of poll workers. 2 June, 
2009.  < http://archives.eac.gov/News/eac-will-award-grants-to-recruit-the-next-
generation-of-poll-workers/>. July 12, 2010. 
Webster, Donna M. and Kruglanski, Arie W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive 
closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 1049-62. 
Wells, Chris, Reedy, Justin, Gastil, John and Carolyn Lee.  (2009).  Information distortion and 
voting choices: The origins and effects of factual beliefs in initiative elections. Political 
Psychology 30(6): 953-969.   
  
 
36 
 
  
 
37 
WEB APPENDIX ONLY – NOT TO BE PRINTED 
 
Experimental Ballot Stimuli 
 
Ballot errors randomly varied across candidates 
Three Conditions: Nonpartisan, Fake Partisan Candidates, Real Candidates 
 
 
 
Clean Vote (Unchallenged)     No Vote (Unchallenged)        Overvote (Unchallenged) 
 
 
Overvote (Unchallenged)       Identifying Mark/Initials             Unclear Write-in 
 
 
          Cross Out           Identifying Mark/Signature        Ambiguous Mark 
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Dot Outside the Bubble Overvote/Vote Retraction        Silly Write-in 
 
 
Circle Outside the Bubble  Check Mark        Overvote/Half filled-in Bubble 
 
 
Bad Erasure   Cross-out/Stray Mark   Overvote/Pencil Rest 
 
 
Half-filled in Bubble   Undervote/Pencil Rest 
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Ballot Counting Guidelines 
 
North Carolina 
 
Standards for Determining What Constitutes a Vote and What Will Be Counted As a Vote 
 
The State Board of Elections has developed these standards and procedures to define what is a vote and 
when that vote should be counted in circumstances in which voting systems are unable to determine the 
voter’s intent with respect to a marked ballot.  This could occur if a voter uses an improper marking 
instrument, marks in an inappropriate manner, places the marks in the wrong location on the ballot, or 
otherwise acts in a manner that causes the voter’s ballot to be unreadable by the voting system for which 
the ballot was designed. 
 
Definitions 
 
Overvote          A voter marks more choices than number of positions allowed in the contest. 
 
Undervote        A voter marks fewer choices than the number of positions allowed in the contest. 
 
Voter Intent     A scanner or other counting machine is unable to determine the voter’s choice on  
                         an official ballot, but human counters can clearly determine the voter’s choice by  
                         hand count the official ballot. 
 
General Standards 
 
Only the official ballots shall be counted according to the principles and rules.  These principle include, 
but are not limited to, determining the voter’s intent, counting all ballot items in which the voter’s intent 
can be determined, and not rejecting an official ballot because of technical errors in the marking unless it  
is impossible to clearly determine the voter’s intent.  If a voter’s intent can be determined, it shall be  
considered to be a valid vote. 
 
If a voter has done anything other than to mark the ballot properly according to ballot marking  
instructions provided, the ballot shall be counted unless it is impossible to determine the voter’s intent.  If  
the voter has shown consistency in marking choices on the ballot, then those choices of the voter shall be 
counted, but shall not be counted if it results in an overvote. 
 
Standards for Determining a Vote that Shall be Counted 
 
If a voter has done anything other than mark the ballot properly according to ballot  
marking instructions provided, the ballot shall be counted according to the voter’s  
indicated intent unless it is impossible to determine the voter’s intent.  If the voter has  
shown consistency in marking choices on the ballot, then those choices of the voter shall be counted, but 
it shall not be counted if it results in an overvote.  Markings indicating voter intent shall include, but not 
be limited to, circling the candidate’s name or voting target area, strike-outs or corrections of choices, or 
writing in the candidate’s name but failing to mark the voting area. 
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Standards for Determining an Invalid Vote 
If a voter uses random markings without a distinctive or consistent voting pattern so that the voter’s 
choice cannot be determined, the vote will be considered invalid. 
 
If the voter writes in a name that is unrecognizable, illegible, or not a real person, the vote will be 
considered invalid. 
GS $ 163-182.1 
 
Principles and rules for counting official ballots. 
 
 (a) General Principles That Shall Apply. – The following general principles shall apply in the 
counting of official ballots, whether the initial count or any recount: 
  (1) Only official ballots shall be counted. 
  (2) No official ballot shall be rejected because of technical errors in  
marking it, unless it is impossible to clearly determine the voter’s choice. 
(3)       If it is impossible to clearly determine a voter’s choice in a ballot     
item, the official ballot shall not be counted for that ballot item, but shall be 
counted in all other ballot items in which the voter’s choice can be clearly 
determined. 
(4)       If an official ballot is marked in a ballot item with more choices   
than there are offices to be filled or propositions that may prevail, the official 
ballot shall not be counted for that ballot item, but shall be counted in all other 
ballot items in which there is no overvote and the voter’s choice can be clearly 
determined. 
(5) If an official ballot is rejected by a scanner or other counting  
machine, but human counters can clearly determine the voter’s choice, the 
official ballot shall be counted by hand and eye. 
  (6) Write-in votes shall not be counted in party primaries or in  
referenda, but shall be counted in general elections if all the following are true: 
a. The write-in vote is written by the voter or by a person authorized to 
assist the voter. 
b. The write-in vote is not case for a candidate who has failed to qualify as 
a write-in candidate. 
c. The voter’s choice can be clearly determined. 
AC 06B .0105 
Counting of Official Ballots 
 
(a)   In the cases where the precinct officials must interpret the voter’s choice, the   
following shall apply: 
(1) When it is impossible to determine a voter’s choice for an office, the ballot  
shall not be counted for that office but shall be counted for all other offices; 
(2) If a ballot is marked for more names than there are positions to be filled, it  
Shall not be counted for that office but shall be counted for all other offices; 
(3) If a ballot has been defaced or torn by a voter so that it is impossible to  
determine that voter’s choice for one or more offices, it shall not be counted for such 
offices but shall be counted for all offices for which the voter’s choice can be determined; 
and 
(4) If a voter has done anything to a ballot other than mark it properly, it shall be  
counted unless such action by the voter makes it impossible to determine the voter’s 
choice. 
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Minnesota 
 
 
  
 
42 
WEB APPENDIX ONLY– NOT TO BE PRINTED 
 
 
